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PUBLIC POLICY AND NEGATING DISCRIMINATORY
EXPROPRIATIONS IN THE MUNICIPAL COURTS

Recent Arab expropriations which were intended as foreign policy
offensives against particular states are raising anew the question of
whether a discriminatory motive constitutes a sufficient objection to a
state's act of expropriation to cause other states to deny it effect with
respect to goods later entering their territories. At a time of severe fuel
shortage, courts in several countries are being asked to invoke the customary international law principle of nondiscrimination to prevent their
nationals from buying oil from the new government operators of certain
expropriated concessions. In light of the relative ineffectiveness of objections to the present lack of compensation, this Note will examine the
viability of the principle of nondiscrimination as a basic argument in
those cases and the obstacles to successfully securing adjudication of the
issue in national forums.
I
BACKGROUND
A. RECENT OIL EXPROPMRATIONS

1. Discriminatory Seizures
In December 1971, Libya's Revolutionary Command Council enacted

an expropriation law by which the assets of the British Petroleum Company's Sarir field operation were seized. 1 Only the British Petroleum
Company was affected,2 and Libya's United Nations representative an-

nounced in the Security Council that the expropriation was in response
to Britain's evacuation of the Tunb Islands in the Persian Gulf, an act
Libya deemed prejudicial to Arab interests. 8 Subsequently, in June 1973,

1. See generally Libya Kicks BP Out and Boycotts OPEC, 69 OiL & GAs J., No. 50,
Dec. 13, 1971, at 40; Haight, Libyan Nationalization oj British Petroleum Company
Assets, 6 Ir'L LAw. 541 (1972); Law Nationalizing British Petroleum Exploration Co.
(Libya), Dec. 7, 1971, in 11 INr'L LEcAL MAT's 380 (1972).
2. See Wall St. Journal, Feb. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6, verifying the continued operation
of at least United States, Dutch, and West German concerns.
3. Mr. Maghribi, Libya's representative, stated in the Security Council that because
Britain had "violated the treaties that it had itself imposed on the Sheikhdoms of
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Libya expropriated the assets of Bunker Hunt, an American company
operating in the Sarir field,4 and stressed in an announcement issued
jointly with Egypt that the act was intended as retaliation against United
States foreign policy in the Middle East.5 Only Bunker Hunt was affected
by the act; the remaining United States and foreign oil companies in
Libya were not affected.6 In February 1974, Libya expropriated three small
American oil companies in order to deal "a severe blow to American interests in the Arab world" on the occasion of the conference of oil-importing nations in Washington. 6a
At the outset of the Middle East war in October 1973, Iraq expropriated the American-owned share of the multinational Basrah Petroleum
Company.7 Only the American interests were affected; British, French,
Dutch, and Panamanian holdings were left untouched.8 A statement
issued by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council indicated that the
seizure was in reply to United States policy in the Middle East;0 a subsequent statement announced that Dutch interests in Basrah Petroleum had
also been expropriated "in punishment for the Netherlands' flagrant
hostile attitude and support for the Zionist enemy."' 0

the Arabian Gulf . . . [Libya had] replied in the only way understood by the
imperialists-by nationalizing the oil interests of Great Britain in the Libyan Arab
Republic ....
U.N. Sec. Council, Prov. Verbatim Rec., S/PV 1610, Dec. 9, 1971, at 96.
4. Wall St. Journal, June 12, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
5. President Sadat said that the decree which Colonel Qadafi announced
marked the opening of a battle against American interests in the entire
Arab world, and that it was incumbent upon America to recognize that she
will never be able to protect her interests in the region if she continues in
her provocation of the Arab nation and in the unlimited support of Israel.
Al-Ahram, June 13, 1973, at 1, col. 6 (author's translation).
Colonel Qadafi is also quoted as referring to the Bunker Hunt seizure as "a slap
on the cold, arrogant face of the United States." JEUNE AFuQuE, Sept. 8, 1973, at 27
(author's translation).
6. Bunker Hunt's Sarir field operation was an attractive target for seizure because
it was relatively small and could easily be absorbed by the state enterprise created
to operate British Petroleum's former Sarir-field concession. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1974, at 21, col. 2 (city ed.).
6a. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.).
7. The Times (London), Oct. 8, 1973, at 21, col. 1.
8. Id. at cols. 1-2.
9. [A] statement issued by the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council . . .
described the nationalization . . . as "a decisive reply by the progressive
nationalist revolution of Iraq against the Imperialist Zionist aggression on the
Arab nation."
°
The statement . . . continued: "Facing that aggression on the Arab nation
necessitates directing a blow at American interests in the Arab nation
so that Arab oil may be a weapon in our hands and not in the hands of
imperialists and Zionists."
Id. at col. 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1973, at 20, col. 8 (city ed.).
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2. The Resulting Litigation
After the seizure of its concession, British Petroleum vowed to bring
suit in municipal courts wherever Libya tried to market the oil. The
company planned to challenge Libya's ownership of the oil by arguing
that the seizure was not worthy of recognition abroad because the expropriation law lacked adequate provision for compensation to the owner
and unjustly discriminated on the basis of nationality." By October 1973,
British Petroleum had initiated actions against more than thirty cargoes
of Sarir-field oil shipped to Italy and against twenty-four cargoes shipped
to Greece.' 2 Following the seizure of its interest, Bunker Hunt joined
British Petroleum in bringing actions against cargoes shipped to Brazil 3
and to the United States.' 4 At this writing, none of the actions has been
completed,15 and no actions are known to have arisen from the Iraqi
seizures.
It is the strategy of the oil companies to impose such legal obstacles to
the marketing of the Sarir-field crude oil that the Libyan government
will be willing to come to a settlement with respect to compensation.'0

11. The first case, BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Societa Industriale Catanese
(SINCA7), was brought in Syracuse, Sicily. The facts of the case are reported in
The Times (London), Jan. 3, 1972, at 13, col. 1. The motion for attachment and
writ of summons in the case are reproduced in 11 Ir'r. LEGAL MAT'LS 328 (1972).
The writ of summons charged, "[Libya] has adopted a singular measure of expropriation vis-a-vis a single foreigner... an eminently political and discriminatory measure
. . . all the more serious in this particular case by reason of the fact that the
expropriated company has not been given any reliable guarantee as to . . . compensation ..
" Id. at 342-43.
12. Letter from M.E.V. Sharpe of British Petroleum to author, Oct. 24, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Sharpe Letter], on file in the offices of the Cornell International
Law Journal. Accord, Wall St. Journal, July 19, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
13. The two "asked a court in Brazil to block Petrobras, the Brazilian oil concern,
from buying crude oil in Libya's nationalized Sarir field." Wall St. Journal, July 19,
1973, at 5, col. 2. "At the moment, there is a dispute as to the correct forum (i.e. State
Court or Federal Court)." Sharpe Letter, supra note 12.
14. They named as defendant Coastal States Gas Producing Co. of Houston ....
The suit, filed in state district court for Harris County (Houston), Texas,
seeks the return of all cargos of Sarir crude or oil products derived from the
cargos or, alternatively, payment of the full market value of the cargos.
Wall St. Journal, Aug. 9, 1973, at 7, col. 1.
"The action . . . was removed by the defendant to the U.S. District Court. A
motion to remand the case to the State Court is due to be heard early next month."
Sharpe Letter, supra note 12. A second shipment to the same defendant reportedly
prompted a maritime chase by U.S. marshals before suit was brought in Philadelphia.
Wall St. Journal, Aug. 21, 1973, at 9, col. 1. Both shipments to the American buyer had
been purchased in Italy, not directly from Libya.
15. "The first such action against SINCAT ... resulted in an unfavourable decision
at first instance earlier this year and the case has gone to appeal. Some of the
other actions are due for their first hearing next month [November, 1973]." Sharpe
Letter, supra note 12.
16. "But it isn't the Sarir oil, or payment for it, that British Petroleum really
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Many observers believe that the bringing of such suits prompted the
Iranian government to come to terms with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the 1950's, despite the very small number of judgments actually
favoring the company.' 7 Libya was thought to be especially vulnerable
to litigation threatening the marketability of the oil because the unusually waxy nature of the Sarir-field oil requires uninterrupted shipping
lest the oil solidify in the field's 320-mile pipeline.' 8
B.

IMPoRTANcE

oF

DISCRIMINATION AS AN OBJECTION

1. The Principle of Nondiscrimination

The Permanent Court of International Justice defined the standard
of nondiscrimination in The Oscar Chinn Case: "The form of discrimination which is forbidden is . . . discrimination based on nationality and
involving differential treatment by reason of their nationality as between
persons belonging to different national groups."' 1 It is the essence of the
discrimination objection that the seizures at issue in these cases were not
pursuant to general national plans for the industries, plans based on
social and economic policy, but were punitive exceptions to those plans,
20
specifically enacted to harm the nationals of particular states.
Although the principle is especially pertinent to expropriation cases,
it is important to understand that those expropriations which appear to
be discriminatory merely because the entire expropriated industry was
controlled by foreigners or by nationals of a particular foreign state do
not fall within the scope of the principle. 21 That exception does not
apply to the Libyan and Iraqi expropriations under consideration,22 and

wants. Instead, it wants compensation for its 50% interest in the field. Although
British Petroleum hasn't said how much compensation it is seeking, the figure is
estimated at around $625 million." Wall St. Journal, June 13, 1973, at 13, col. 1.
17. See Editorial, Libya's Weak Case in Law, The Times (London), Jan. 4, 1972, at
11, col. 3. "Not all the actions were successful, but they did have the effect of
dissuading customers from disregarding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's warning,
couched in not dissimilar terms to that given by BP."
18. "'If it ever stops,' an American oil expert says, 'it would [sic] solidify and
present Libya with the world's longest candle.'" Wall St. Journal, Feb. 3, 1972, at 1,
col. 6.
19. The Oscar Chinn Case, [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63, at 65, 87.
20. This is not to say that the seizures were not for a public purpose, but merely
that the public purpose served was not a permissible one.
21. See, e.g., G. WHrrE, NATONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 131 (1961). The
author there notes that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company cases should be considered
nondiscriminatory, since the expropriated enterprise was the only operating oil
company in Iran, no other valid concessions were outstanding, and none could be
subsequently granted.
22. See notes 2 & 8 supra and accompanying text.
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the available facts suggest that the contention that those seizures were
in violation of the nondiscrimination principle is a valid one. The cases

being considered must also be distinguished from similar suits contesting
seizures pursuant to a general policy. 23 While doubtless based on the

same strategy of encumbering marketing, those actions cannot convincingly rely on the nondiscrimination principle as an objection, and
will have to rely entirely on allegations of noncompensation.
2. Relative Weakness of the Noncompensation Objection

The argument that an act of expropriation should be denied effect
abroad because it did not provide a reliable guarantee of adequate compensation is unlikely to prevail with respect to the seizures considered

here. In past cases of challenged expropriations, courts have frequently
assumed that, absent express language to the contrary, the taking government would pay just compensation. Some of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company cases foundered on that very assumption.2 4 The decree "nationalizing" British Petroleum's assets in Libya specifically provides that
compensation will be paid, and the law relating to Bunker Hunt's

interests may be assumed to be similar.25 The Iraqi decree also declares

23. Libya's general plan of fifty-one percent state participation has been resisted
by the oil companies. Several companies, including Dutch as well as American interests,
announced that they would seek to block the sale of Libyan crude oil by court
action. Their contention was that the compensation offered by Libya was insufficient.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § 4, at 4, col. 2. Texaco has filed two suits against S.p.A.
Raffinerie Sarde, an Italian importer, and other actions are expected. See Wall St.
Journal, Sept. 28, 1973, at 19, col. 2. But clearly the fifty-one percent scheme is to
be applied industry-wide, without regard to nationality. The more bitter pill of
complete seizure suffered by British Petroleum and Bunker Hunt must be seen as
exceptional treatment.
24. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 INT'L. L. Rm,.
305, 313 (High Ct. Tokyo 1953), the court ruled that language in the expropriation
act calling for the payment of compensation made the act "not . . . completely confiscatory" and that as a result the court could not "try the validity or invalidity of
such a law by examining the compensation and seeing whether or not it is 'adequate,
effective and immediate'...." In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 INT'L. L.
REP. 23, 40 (Civil Ct. Rome 1954), the court was equally reluctant to look beyond
the text of the law: "The search for any concealed . . . motives on the part of the
law-giver, which are not revealed by the text of the law. . . would ... not be open
to this Court.. . ." The court found that the statute's provision for compensation was
a sufficient guarantee: "[I]t is enough that there is some compensation for the expropriation to be lawful." Id. at 36 (italics in original). Indeed, the court held that there
was no need for the law to provide for compensation equal in value to the property
seized.
25. Law Nationalizing British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya), art. V, Dec. 7, 1971,
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 380, 381 (1972); "The State shall pay the party concerned
compensation for all property of funds, rights and assets transferred in accordance
with Article 1 above." See 3 PROGPmSSvE LIBYA, Nos. 3 & 4, Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 9,
reporting the designation of the committee to determine the compensation due
Bunker Hunt. The formation of a similar committee to deal with the February 1974
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that compensation will be paid.26 To be sure, some courts have been
willing to look beyond the mere stated intention of the seizing government, and the noncompensation argument retains some vitality in those
27
instances.
The importance attached to the discrimination contention is emphasized by the fact that both the British and American governments, after
initially recognizing the right of Libya to nationalize the enterprises
provided that compensation were paid, revised their positions and protested the Libyan seizures on the ground that they had been discriminatory.28 Both governments then undertook diplomatic initiatives to discourage other nations from buying the oil which they asserted had been
29
seized in violation of international law.
C. STATUS OF NONDISCRIMINATION

AS INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. The Views of Publicists and InternationalForums

Principles purporting to limit a country's right to expropriate the
property of aliens are beset by doubts as to the present applicability of
traditional formulations of international standards of conduct. From the
perspective of some Third World countries, those principles are relics
of nineteenth century Great Power domination whose modern role is the
perpetuation of economic imperialism.8 0 Furthermore, it has been argued
that the ability to discriminate against particular foreign states is essential
to meaningful sovereignty.8 1 Yet the United Nations Resolution on Per-

seizures has been announced. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 5, and at 21, col. 1
(city ed.).
26. See The Times (London), Oct. 8, 1973, at 21, col. 2:
Both Companies [Exxon and Mobil, owners of the affected shares in Basrah
Petroleum Co.] will receive compensation for the assets, funds and rights,
but the Iraq Government has reserved the right to rescind the decision to
indemnify them totally or partially should the companies try to sabotage
or destroy any of the oilfields or installations.
27. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, 20 INT'L L. RP. 316, 320-22 (Sup. Ct. Aden
1953); Bank Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij and Twentsche Bank, 30 INT'L
L. REP. 28, 29-31 (Ct. App. Amsterdam 1959).
28. The Times (London), Dec. 24, 1971, at 15, col. 1; JEUNE AFRIQUE, Sept. 8, 1973,
at 27.
29. See The Times (London), Dec. 24, 1971, at 15, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1973,
at 1, col. 4.
30. Remarks of Mr. Nervo, [1957] 1 Y.B. INTL' L. Coimm'N 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106
(1957). See generally M. AKnuasr, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
205 (1970); M. MUGHRABY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER Om. REsouiRcEs 9-11 (1966).
31. Baade, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, in EssAYs
ON EXPROPRIATIONS (1967), at 24:
Discrimination can be dictated by a number of reasons: preferences based on
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manent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources is ambiguous on the quesdon of discrimination, requiring that the reason for the expropriation be
such as is "recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests,
both domestic and foreign.

'3 2

No case in an international court has repudiated the ruling in The
Oscar Chinn Case.33 More in point is the judgment announced by the
arbitrator named by the International Court of Justice to consider British
Petroleum's claim against Libya. 34 The company had asked the Court
to name an arbitrator after Libya refused to cooperate in the arbitration

called for in the concession agreement. The arbitrator held that the
seizure violated international law in that it was made for "purely

extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in
character."35 But arbitration, while important here in showing the

accepted international law, has no bearing on the litigation in the various
national courts. Only the parties to the arbitration are bound by the out-

considerations of foreign policy, military alliances, and the like; ethnic or

cultural preferences or aversions; retaliation; or . . . decolonization in fact
as well as in law. Independence would seem an empty gesture or even a cruel
hoax to many a new country if it were prevented from singling out the key
investments of the former colonial power for nationalization. There is no
support in law or reason for the proposition that a taking that meets other
relevant tests of legality is illegal under international law merely because it is
discriminatory [footnote omitted].
32. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda item 39, at 58, 60 (1962).
Debate over the continued validity of the nondiscrimination principle surfaced in
the letters columns of The Times of London in response to British Petroleum's vow
to fight Libya's seizure. See Haight, supra note 1, at 542, for a summary of the
debate. Two writers defended Libya's right to nationalize for whatever reasons its
leaders deemed to be in its best interests, but the overwhelming reply from a number
of scholars held to the traditional ban on discrimination. Letter of Musa Mazzawi,
The Times (London), Jan. 3, 1972, at 14, col. 6; Letter of D.J. Appadurai, The Times
(London), Jan. 10, 1972, at 16, col. 7. Letters of I. Brownlie and M. Akehurst, The
Times (London), Jan. 14, 1972, at 16, col. 5; Letters of R.Y. Jennings and G. Schwarzenberger, The Times (London), Jan. 17, 1972, at 14, cols. 6 & 8. There is considerable
support in the literature for this position. See S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATIONS IN INTERaNATIONAL LAw 190 (1953); I. FOGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND COMPENSATION 148-53 (1964);
G. Wnrm, supra note 21, at 119; B. WORTLEY, EXPROPmATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 120-25 (1959).
33. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
34. BP Public Affairs and Information Department, Press Release of Oct. 11, 1973;
The Times (London), Oct. 12, 1973, at 25, col. 1. The text of the judgment is not
presently available to the author and the press release and newspaper report are
relied
upon.
35. Although
basing his decision on the arbitrary and discriminatory character of
the seizure, Judge Lagergren did go on to consider the question of compensation:
"Nearly two years has [sic] now passed since the nationalisation and the fact that
no offer of compensation has been made indicates that the taking was also confiscatory."
BP Public Affairs and Information Department, Press Release of Oct. 11, 1973. Implicit
in this is the difficulty of establishing noncompensation when the language of the
law provides for it; there is no uniform rule providing that a two-year delay in
payment is sufficient to belie the guarantee.
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come, and third parties are not obliged to assist in implementing the
88
decision.
2. The Views of Municipal Courts
The principle of nondiscrimination, in the abstract, has enjoyed considerable support from the municipal courts. For example, all of the
courts adjudicating the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company cases accepted the
principle as a rule of customary international law.8 7 The initial judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Sabbatino was in accord: "When a State treats aliens of a particular
country discriminatorily to their detriment, that State violates international law."88 There have been some expressions of doubt as to the
universality of the rule8 9 and some judgments that, even as an international rule, it might not be applied because of the non-binding status
of such rules under domestic law. 40 However, no case has been found in
which a court has expressly rejected the rule.
Nonetheless, the condemnation of discrimination has ordinarily either
not formed the basis of a court's award or has done so only in combination with other factors, notably noncompensation. 41 Indeed, the Second

36. Cf. E. NANmvi, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
LAw 174 (1966). There were unofficial
reports following the arbitral decision that Libya had decided to pay compensation to
British Petroleum, but the amount reported was quite small, and the company announced that it had not been approached by Libya. -Wall St. Journal, Oct. 25, 1973,
at 17, col. 2.
37. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, 20 INT'L L. REP. 316, 324 (Sup. Ct. Aden
1953); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 INT'L L. Rn. 23, 40 (Civil Ct.
'Rome 1954); see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20
INT'L L. RE'. 305, 307 (High Ct. Tokyo 1953).
38. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 867 (2d Cir. 1962). The
court said, at 866,
[D]espite our best efforts to deal fairly with political and social doctrines vastly
ARBITRAL AwARDs IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

different from our own ... [p]eacetime seizure of the property of nationals
of a particular country, as an act of reprisal against that country, appears to

this court to be contrary to generally accepted ptinciples of morality throughout the world.
39. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1964).
40. See N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen and N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v.
Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., 28 INTL L. Rxv. 16, 26 (Ct.
App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959) [hereinafter cited textually for convenience as Bremen
Tobacco Case]:
Even if one were to assume that the Indonesian Nationalization Act in many
respects conflicts with generally valid rules of international law, it is nevertheless impossible to establish that the ... Act ... should therefore from the
start be treated as null and void by the national courts in accordance with
the present status of international law and the jurisprudence....
41. Two of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. cases, supra note 37, were found not to
involve discrimination in fact; the third, decided in Aden, was decided on the
grounds of noncompensation.
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Circuit's first Sabbatino ruling, although including an unambiguous statement that discrimination itself was a violation of international law,
would not go so far as to assert that discrimination alone would invalidate the expropriation; rather, the court relied upon a combination of
factors, including noncompensadon.4
This uncertainty about the independent significance of discrimination
as an argument raised in a national court places the oil companies'
strategy in some doubt. If they are to prevail, they must bring their suits
in courts willing either (a) to find noncompensation despite the statutory
language and to hold it sufficient to invalidate -the seizure48 or (b) to
find discrimination and to hold it sufficient to invalidate the seizure. The
relative weakness of the noncompensation argument on the facts of
the cases under consideration has already been noted; the discrimination
argument is more persuasive, but is dependent upon access to national
courts which will give effect to this customary principle of international
law4 4 In order to reach these issues, however, there are several initial
obstacles which must be overcome.
Lr
LIONS IN THE PATH

A. THE AcT oF STATE DoaraINE
The Act of State Doctrine is the first obstacle to be overcome en route
to an effective adjudication of discrimination. Briefly stated, the doctrine
is that "courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another state done within its own territory." 45 Most courts
do not regard the doctrine as a binding rule of international law, but,
"[i]f international law does not prescribe use of the doctrine, neither does
it forbid application of the rule even if it is claimed that the act of state
46
in question violated international law."

42. 807 F.2d at 868. The Supreme Court noted this with reluctance in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407 (1964).
43. Even on the strength of a dear factual showing of noncompensation, that

argument is no more self-executing than is discrimination. "mhe authorities I have
reviewed do show that these [English] courts have not recognised any principle that
confiscation without adequate compensation is per se a ground for refusing recognition
to foreign legislation." Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R. 129, 140 (Ch.).
44. "Refusal by the municipal courts of one sovereignty to sanction the action of
a foreign state done contrary to the law of nations will often be the only deterrent
to such violations." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 807 F.2d 845, 868 (2d
Cir. 1962).
45. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
46. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 898, 422 (1964).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

[Vol. 7: 171

In general, however, the trend is away from firm rules barring evaluation of the acts of other states.47 Courts have often been willing to
consider the acts of foreign states when those acts were judged to be
commercial rather than governmental in nature, 48 and some courts have
declined to employ the doctrine when the act in question was alleged to
be in violation of international law. 49 Another exception to the doctrine
has arisen when its application and the consequent victory for the foreign
enactment would yield a result contrary to the public policy of the
forum. 50 Indeed, it may be more accurate to depict the invoking of
the Act of State Doctrine as "the exception and not the rule." 5' 1 In either
case, the doctrine remains to be in'voked or excepted to as the public
policy of the forum demands. 52
It is clear that the Act of State Doctrine need not defeat the oil companies' efforts to obtain adjudication of their claims. But it is equally
clear that the doctrine could be an insurmountable obstacle in forums
having public policy interests which would be served by declining jurisdiction.

B. THE CHOICE OF LAWS
If a court is willing to consider the merits of the case, it will have to
decide what body of substantive law is to govern the disposition of the
oil. The rule ordinarily applied is lex rei sitae, the law of the place where
the oil was located at the time of the seizure. 3 The application of the law
of the expropriating country is not likely to benefit the oil companies.

47. See E. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES 176 (1967).
48. See, e.g., Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 17 INT'L L. RE.P. 155, 156 (Sup.
Ct. Austria 1950).
49. Though it should be admitted that, as a rule, a Court will not, and
should not, sit in judgment on the lawfulness of acts jure imperii performed
by, or on behalf of, a foreign Government, this rule must be subject to an
exception when the acts in question can be deemed to be in flagrant conflict
with international law.
Bank Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij and Twentsche Bank, 30 INT'L L. REP. 28,
29-30 (Ct. App. Amsterdam 1959).
50. See Moulin v. Volatron, 8 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. CAsEs 191 (Commercial
Tribunal Marseilles, France 1937); Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R.
129, 140 (Ch.). Cf. N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen and N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., 28 INT'L L. REP.
16, 24 (Ct. App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959).
51. E. MOONEY, supra note 47, at 177.
52. The United States, in the wake of Sabbatino, is a good example. The Sabbatino
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), provides, in effect, that the doctrine be
the exception rather than the rule, but that it be applicable in those cases in which
the executive certifies that the public policy (in this case "foreign policy interests')
requires its use.
53. E.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushihi Kaisha, 20 INT'L
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One way to unseat an expropriation statute from its position as the
applicable substantive law would be by showing that it was invalid within
the legal system of the expropriating country.54 In that case the statute
would not apply because it would not represent the true lex rei sitae.
The proof of that invalidity would, however, be difficult in light of the
presumptions favoring the foreign state's enactment 55 and the limits,
imposed by notions of comity, on the scope of the court's inquiry.5 6 In
the cases of Libya 57 and Iraq5 s there is reason to doubt that constitutional
provisions would in any way invalidate the seizures.
But lex rei sitac itself may be defeated if the outcome of applying the
law of the expropriating country would be offensive to the public policy
of the forum. Cheshire notes this overriding role of public policy in the

L. REP. 805, 315-16 (High Ct. Tokyo 1953):
Artide 10 of the Japanese Horei . . . lays down that the acquisition or loss
of ownership of movables and immovables shall be determined by the law of
the place where the object in question is situated at the time of the occurrence
of the fact or facts constituting the cause of such acquisition or loss ....
The Bremen Tobacco Case, 28 INT'L L. REP. at 21 (Ct. App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959),
... Cf. Moulin v.
states that "for all rights in rem the lex rei sitae is decisive.
Volatron, 8 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 191, 192 (Commercial Tribunal Marseilles,
France 1987); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 INT'L L. REP. 23, 42 (Civil
Ct. Rome 1954). See G. CHESHIRE, CHESHIRE's PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 125-26 (7th
ed. 1965); A. EHmRNZWEIG, C. FRAGISTAS & A. YIANNOPOULOS, AmERICAN-GREEK PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1957);
TIONAL LAw 67 (1968).

G. VAN HECKE, AmERICAN-BELGIAN PRIVATE INTERNA-

54. Cf. Drale v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 17 INT'L L. REP. 155 (Sup. Ct. Austria
1950); N.V. Verenigde Del-Maatschappijen and N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v.
Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., 28 INT'L L. REP. 16 (Ct. App.
Bremen, W. Ger. 1959); Moulin v. Volatron, 8 ANN. DIG. FUR. INTL' L. CASES 155 (Cornmercial Tribunal Marseilles, France 1987).
55. Unable to determine the validity of the expropriation decree in question under
Spanish law, the French court in Moulin v. Volatron assumed its validity.
56. As a matter of comity, some courts have been unwilling to look beyond the four
corners of the expropriation decree. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22
INT'L L. REP. 23, 39-40 (Civil Ct. Rome 1954); N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen
and N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgeselschaft
m.b.H., 28 INT'L L. REP. 16, 25 (Ct. App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959).
57. Article 8 of the Libyan Constitution provides for the protection of private
non-exploiting ownership. The same article announces that public ownership is the
basis for development and progress, and article 6 proclaims the goal of socialism.
Expropriation as such, therefore, would not seem unconstitutional. The constitution,
like article I of the Libyan Civil Code (available in unofficial translation in M. ANJELL
& I. AL-AmF, THE LIBYAN CIVIL CODE (1969)) provides for recourse to Islamic principles
in the absence of specific provisions, and Islamic principles have no objection to
discrimination against nonmuslim, foreign interests. P. Hrrrn, HISTORY OF THE ARABS
170 (1970); R. LEVY, THE SOCml STaucruRE oF Isr.A 66-67 (1969). It is characteristic
of Islamic law that it is flexible and adjusts to accommodate the actions of political
leaders. D. De Santillano, Law and Society, in THE LEGACY OF ISLAM 806-07 (T.
Arnold 9:A. Guillaume eds. 1931).
58. The Islamic background is equally pertinent to Iraq, as the Provisional
Constitution of April 29, 1964 (available in unofficial translation in L. KIMBALL, THE
CHANGING PATrERN OF POWER IN IRAQ, 1958 to 1971, at 289 (1972)), invokes the spirit

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

[Vol. 7: 171

English courts, 59 and Schlesinger points out that it can be observed in
most civil law systems. 60 Most of the reported challenges to expropriations
have relied principally upon this public policy exception in their efforts to
defeat the expropriation laws, contending that noncompensation and discrimination offend the policy of the forum.61 Frequently there need not be
any specific interest of the forum state or one of its nationals in the
litigation to prompt the application of public policy; the mere presence
of the contested property within the forum is a sufficient contact.6 2
It is clear that a forum's choice of laws decision need not result in the
application of the challenged expropriation decree. It is equally dear,
however, that, barring the unlikely finding that the decree was unconstitutional within the legal system of the seizing state, the oil companies
can only hope to raise their discrimination objection effectively if the
public policy of the forum would thereby be served.
C.

THE PUBLIC POLICY

1. Identifying the Content of Public Policy

It has been shown that both access to the courts and the displacement
of the law of the seizing state depend principally upon the public policy
of the forum.68 Scholars have long been frustrated in their efforts to

of Islam. That document provides, however, that private property is to be inviolable.

Nonetheless, the "charter" promulgated in July of 1964 calls for socialism and the
struggle against imperialism, and it would undoubtedly be difficult to establish the
unconstitutionality of the Iraqi seizures. See H. & P. WILLEMART, DOSSIER DU MOYONORIENT ARABE 112 (1969).
59. G. CHESHIRE, supra note 53, at 142-43.
60. R. SCHLESINGER, ComPARATivE LAW 602 (2d ed. 1970).
61. "But if the contents of the law contravene public policy and good morals, then,
in view of the provisions of article 30 of the Horei, they ought not to be enforced in
this country.
" Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 22 INT'L
L. Ra,.305, 313 (High Ct. Tokyo 1953).
In my judgment the true limits of the principle that the courts of this
country will afford recognition to legislation of foreign states in so far as it
affects title to movables in that state at the time of the legislation . . . rests
in considerations of international law or in the scarcely less difficult considerations of public policy as understood in these courts, ultimately I believe the
latter is the governing consideration.
Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R. 129, 140 (Ch.).
62. E.g., Moulin v. Volatron, 8 ANN. DIG. PuB. INT'L L. CASES 191 (Commercial
Tribunal Marseilles, France 1937). But cI. N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen and
N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft
m.b.H., 28 INT'L L. REP. 16, 32 (Ct. App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959).
63. The terms "public policy" and "ordre public" are here used interchangeably,
in conformance with Lauterpacht's assessment that they are essentially the same,
save for the possibility that ordre Public might be a somewhat broader term. See
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), [1958] I.C.J. 55, 90-91 (separate opinion of
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derive formulae which could predict the scope of judicial invocations of
public policy. 64 The consensus that a policy which is to override the
otherwise applicable law should be a policy of some importance does
little to further predictability.65 Friedman despairs at "the relative character of municipal law conceptions ... [which] depend upon whether
or not the municipal judge considers that the fundamental conceptions
on which the particular expropriation is based conform to his ideas of
public policy." 60
Lauterpacht's definition of public policy as "fundamental national
conceptions of law, decency and morality" emphasizes the indefiniteness
of the concept. 07 Indeed, public policy is frequently treated with such
generality that the identity of those conceptions is concealed. 68 Carlston
has suggested that the formal rules proclaimed by the courts can only
be understood in terms of the interests which they seek to safeguard.6 9
Without doubting the occasional rule of abstract principles of justice
subscribed to by the forum, it is suggested that two factors which are
sometimes represented in public policy are the interests of nationals of
the forum and the nonlegal interests of the forum state.
It is probably not coincidental that the challenged expropriation cases
in which the former owners have been victorious have generally been
70
those adjudicated in the states of the dispossessed owners' nationalities.

Lauterpacht, J.). DeLaume also concludes that the terms are roughly the same, with

the French ordre public merely having a more active role owing to French choice of

law rules which call for the application of foreign rules more frequently than do
American rules. G. DELAUm, AmERmcAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2d
ed. 1961). Cheshire notes a trend towards broader uses of public policy in the common
law countries. G. CHusumn,
supra note 53, at 139-40.
64. See Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MxNN. L.

Rrv. 196, 200 (1935).
65. See E. RABEL, 2 THE CoNFLicrs OF LAWs 553-54 (2d ed. 1960).
66. S. FaavmAN, supra note 32, at 222 (footnote omitted).
67. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), [1958] I.C.J. 55, 90 (separate opinion
of Lauterpacht, J.).
68. See P. LAGARDE, REC-EmcHEs SUR L'ORDRE PUBLIC EN DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVA
(1959), at 238:
The foreign rule is not set aside because it is contrary to a fundamental
principle of the law of the forum. It is set aside because, integrated into the
law of the forum, it could not be combined in a coherent way with the diverse
rules of the forum with which it would come into contact (author's translation,
emphasis added).
69. Carlston, Nationalization: An Analytical Approach, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 405, 412
(1959).
70. See, e.g., Bank Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij and Twentsche Bank, 30
INT'L L. REP. 28 (Ct. App. Amsterdam 1959); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, 20
INT'L L. REP. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden 1953) (Aden was at that time a British colony).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

-

[Vol. 7: 171

Indeed, some courts have been perfectly candid in applying a different
standard to the claims of their nationals.71 On that basis, one might reasonably expect the public policies of the states of the dispossessed owners
to favor entertaining their suits, and to find discriminatory acts suffticiently distasteful to require exclusion of the otherwise applicable foreign
law.72
As for the nonlegal interests of the forum state, it has been urged that
public policy overrides the normal outcome in instances "[w]here a transaction prejudices the interests of the . .. [forum] or its good relations

with foreign powers."73 Thus, a party in a position to influence the
economic interests or diplomatic relations of the forum state could
indirectly influence crucial determinations on which the litigation depends. Domke has suggested, for example, that the decision in The
Bremen Tobacco Case was effectively dictated by a newspaper editorial
detailing the economic hardships which would beset Bremen if the court
reached the wrong decision. 74 In that case, the public policy was dedared to recognize a special anticolonial exception to the otherwise acceptable nondiscrimination rule.7 5 Similar outcomes might be foreseen
in the oil expropriation cases.
2. Oil Shortage and the Public Policy
In a time of oil shortage, the oil consuming nations have shown themselves to be vulnerable to pressure from the exporting nations, and those
aspects of the cases which are dependent upon determinations of public
policy are less likely to be decided favorably to the companies when such
a decision threatens the fuel supply of the forum state.70 In the months

71. See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, 20

INT'L

L. Rm. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden

1953). Note also the Bremen Tobacco Case, 28 INT'L L. REP. 16 (Ct. App. Bremen,
W. Ger. 1959), and the Confiscation of Property of the Sudeten Germans Case, 15
ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'l L. CAsEs 24 (Amtsgericht of Dingolfing, W. Ger. 1948).

72. In the United States that outcome, absent overriding foreign policy considerations,

would be dictated by statute. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(l)-(2) (1970).
73. G. CaHzsin, supra note 53, at 138. Cheshire was writing with specific reference
to the United Kingdom.
74. If the court obviates the declared intention of the Indonesian Government
to transfer the centre of tobacco [dealing] to Bremen, it will go to other

countries without doubt, under circumstances even to a territory beyond the

Iron Curtain.
Domke, Indonesian NationalizationMeasures Before Foreign Courts, 54 Ar. J.
305, 323 n.91 (1960), translating from Die Zeit, Aug. 7, 1959, at 4.

INT'L

L.

75. 28 INT'L L. Rm,. at 36: "[E]quals must be treated alike, but the dissimilar treatment of those who are not equal is permitted."
76. Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § 4, at 4, col. 2:

But in the present state of the international oil market, as consuming
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since most of the suits were brought, the fuel shortage has become much
more severe, and trading in oil has dearly become a seller's market.7 7
The device of posting a bond for the value of the cargo while permitting
the oil itself to enter the stream of commerce is clearly a short-term solution, pending the outcome of the litigation; 78 it no longer strains
credulity to posit a seller's simple refusal to do further business with a
state whose courts have awarded the proceeds of a sale to the dispossessed
concessionaire.7 9 The increased price being received by the producers
makes the sales to any particular state less important,8 0 and other buyers
are available, including not only socialist countries which are unsympathetic to the dispossessed owners,8 ' but also nations whose needs for
fuel require that principles of cooperation with their allies be compro82
mised.
Thus, insofar as the concrete, nonlegal aspects of public policy are
dominant, the principle of nondiscrimination will be applicable only in
those states whose nationals will profit from its application. Those states
will be faced with the need to choose between a policy favoring the rights
of the expropriated concessionaires and one more likely to assure a
continued supply of fuel. Lauterpacht has observed that countries vary
with respect to their willingness to permit public policy to interfere with
title to goods in such cases, but he concludes that apparent restraint of
public policy is often offset by procedural and substantive rules yielding
the same result as an unabashed application of public policy.88 "On the
'hole, the result is the same in most countries-so much so that the recog-

countries scramble to secure supplies, neither American warnings nor the
threatened legal actions seem likely to prevent marketing of Libyan oil, especially in Europe.
This comment, describing the reaction to Libya's fifty-one percent participation plan,
is equally appropriate to the seizure cases under consideration.
77. At this writing, restrictions on the use of petroleum have become common in
the developed nations, and gasoline rationing has begun in several countries. Wall
St. Journal, Jan. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
78. See, e.g., Wall St. Journal, Aug. 21, 1973, at 9, col. 1.
79. The recent Arab oil boycott has, on the whole, been quite successful. See Vicker,
An Arab Oil Squeeze That Works, Wall St. Journal, Nov. 6, 1973, at 22, col. 4.
The much publicized "leakage" of oil to the United States has been considerably
reduced. See Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 1974, at 6, col. 8.
80. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973, § 4, at 1, col. 1. The posted price of Arab oil rose
470% in 1973.
81. Wall St. Journal, June 8, 1972, at 30, col. 2.
82. Western efforts to present a united front in the face of the Arab oil boycott
have been unsuccessful. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1974, at 22, col. 4; Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
83. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), [1958] I.Cj. 55, 92 (separate opinion
of Lauterpacht, J.).
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nition of the part of ordre public must be regarded as a general principle
of law in the field of private international law."M4
CONCLUSION

The recent oil expropriation laws by which Libya and Iraq sought to
further their foreign policy objectives arguably violated international law
both in being discriminatory and in failing to provide adequate compensation to the dispossessed owners. Of these two objections, discrimination
is the stronger to raise in a municipal court outside the expropriating
state because it does not require the court to question the good faith of
the seizing country's stated intention to compensate. Although nondiscrimination is an acknowledged rule of customary international law, its
actual application by the municipal courts is subject to question.
A study of the possible obstacles to obtaining effective adjudication
of the discrimination issue in the municipal courts indicates that considerations of public policy are dominant. Public policy is found to
encompass not only abstract principles of justice, but also the nonlegal
interests of the forum state and of its nationals. Thus, public policy
considerations might be expected to favor the dispossessed owners in
cases brought in their national courts. Even there, however, and more so
in third-party forums, the worsening fuel shortage, and the new found
ability of the sellers to act in concert against uncooperative nations, may
be expected to dictate public policy determinations favorable to the
expropriating state, resulting not in a condemnation of discrimination,
but rather in a host of legal rationales designed to avoid facing the
question.8 5
Donald F. Rieger, Jr.

84. Id.

85. The makings of a determination that the public interest is not served by the oil

companies' strategy of impeding marketing can be discerned in the press response to
Senator Frank Church's inquiries into its effect on consumer prices. Wall St. Journal,
Feb. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1.

